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Abstract— In this work we consider the communication of
information in the presence of a causal adversarial jammer.
In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate
a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x =
(x1, . . . , xn) bit-by-bit over a communication channel. The
adversarial jammer can view the transmitted bits xi one at
a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However,
the decisions of the jammer must be made in an online or
causal manner. Namely, for each bit xi the jammer’s decision
on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must
depend only on xj for j ≤ i. This is in contrast to the “classical”
adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete
knowledge of x. We present a non-trivial upper bound on the
amount of information that can be communicated. We show
that the achievable rate can be asymptotically no greater than
min{1 − H(p), (1 − 4p)+}. Here H(.) is the binary entropy
function, and (1 − 4p)+ equals 1 − 4p for p ≤ 0.25, and 0
otherwise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following adversarial communication sce-
nario. A sender Alice wishes to transmit a message u to a
receiver Bob. To do so, Alice encodes u into a codeword
x and transmits it over a binary channel. The codeword
x = x1, . . . , xn is a binary vector of length n. However,
Calvin, a malicious adversary, can observe x and corrupt up
to a p-fraction of the n transmitted bits, i.e., pn bits.
In the classical adversarial channel model, e.g., [4], it is
usually assumed that Calvin has full knowledge of the entire
codeword x, and based on this knowledge (together with the
knowledge of the code shared by Alice and Bob) Calvin can
maliciously plan what error to impose on x. We refer to
such an adversary as an omniscient adversary. For binary
channels, the optimal rate of communication in the presence
of an omniscient adversary has been an open problem in
classical coding theory for several decades. The best known
lower bound is given by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [10],
[18], which implies that Alice can transmit at rate 1−H(2p)
to Bob. Conversely, the tightest upper bound was given by
McEliece et al. [12], and has a positive gap from the lower
bound for all p ∈ (0, 1/4) (see Fig. 1).
In this work we initiate the analysis of coding schemes
that allow communication against certain adversaries that are
weaker than the omniscient adversary. We consider adver-
saries that behave in a causal or online manner. Namely, for
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Fig. 1. Bounds on capacity of the adversarial channel. The bold line in
purple is our upper bound of min{1−H(p), (1− 4p)+}.
each bit xi, we assume that Calvin decides whether to change
it or not (and if so, how to change it) based on the bits xj ,
for j ≤ i alone, i.e., the bits that he has already observed. In
this case we refer to Calvin as a causal adversary.
Causal adversaries arise naturally in practical settings,
where adversaries typically have no a priori knowledge of
Alice’s message u. In such cases they must simultaneously
learn u based on Alice’s transmissions, and jam the corre-
sponding codeword x accordingly. This causality assumption
is reasonable for many communication channels, both wired
and wireless, where Calvin is not co-located with Alice. For
example consider the scenario in which the transmission of
x = x1, . . . , xn is done during n channel uses over time,
where at time i the bit xi is transmitted over the channel.
Calvin can only corrupt a bit when it is transmitted (and
thus its error is based on its view so far). To decode the
transmitted message, Bob waits until all the bits have arrived.
As in the omniscient model, Calvin is restricted in the number
of bits pn he can corrupt. This might be because of limited
processing power or limited transmit energy.
Recently, the problem of codes against causal adversaries
was considered and solved by the authors [6] for large-
q channels, i.e., channels where Alice’s codeword x =
x1, . . . , xn is considered to be a vector of length n over a
field of “large” size q. Each symbol xi may represent a large
packet of bits in practice. Calvin is allowed to arbitrarily
corrupt a p-fraction of the symbols, rather than bits. A tight
characterization of the rate-region for various scenarios is
given in [6], and computationally efficient codes that achieve
these rate-regions are presented. However, the techniques
used in characterizing the rate-region of causal adversaries
over large-q channels do not work over binary channels.
This is because each symbol in a large-q channel can contain
within it a “small” hash that can be used to verify the symbol.
This is the crux of the technique used to achieve the lower
bounds in [6]. We currently do not know how to extend this
method to binary channels. Conversely, for upper bounds,
the geometry of the space of length-n codewords over large-
q alphabets is significantly different than that corresponding
to binary alphabets. For instance, for large-q channels the
volume of an n-sphere of radius αn (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) over Fq is
∼ qnα, This leads to simpler bounds for large-q channels.
In this work we initiate the study of binary causal-
adversary channels, and present two upper bounds on their
capacity: 1 − H(p), and (1 − 4p)+. The upper bound of
1 −H(p) is very “natural”. Namely, it is not hard to verify
that if Calvin attacks Alice’s transmission by simulating the
well-studied Binary Symmetric Channel [4], he can force a
communication rate of no more than 1 − H(p). The upper
bound of (1− 4p)+ presented in this work is non-trivial for
both its implications and its proof techniques. The bound
demonstrates that at least for some values of p, the achievable
rate is bounded away from 1 − H(p). For p ∈ (p0, 0.5),
1 − 4p is strictly less than 1 − H(p) (here p0 is the value
of p satisfying H(p) = 4p, and can be computed to be
approximately 0.15642 . . .). In fact for p ∈ (0.25, 0.5) our
bound implies that no communication at positive rate is
possible, which is much stronger than the result obtained
by the upper bound of 1 − H(p) (see Fig. 1). Our proof
techniques include a combination of tools from the fields
of Extremal Combinatorics (e.g. Tura´n’s theorem [17]), and
classical Coding Theory (e.g. the Plotkin bound [14], [2]).
II. MODEL
For any integer i let [i] denote the set {1, . . . , i}. Let R ≥ 0
be Alice’s rate. An (n,Rn)-code C is defined by Alice’s
encoder and Bob’s corresponding decoder, as below.
Alice: Alice’s message u is assumed to be a random variable
U with entropy Rn, over alphabet U . We consider two types
of encoding schemes for Alice.
For deterministic codes, Alice’s message U is assumed to
be uniformly distributed over U = [2Rn]. Her deterministic
encoder is a deterministic function fD(.) that maps every
u in [2Rn] to a vector x(u) = (x1, . . . , xn) in {0, 1}n.
Alice’s codebook X is the collection {x(u)} of all possible
transmitted codewords.
More generally, Alice and Bob may use probabilistic
codes. For such codes, the random variable U corresponding
to Alice’s message pU may have an arbitrary distribution
pU (with entropy Rn) over an arbitrary alphabet U . Alice’s
codebook X is an arbitrary collection {X (u)} of subsets of
{0, 1}n. For each subset X (u) ⊂ X , there is a corresponding
codeword random variable X(u) with codeword distribution
pX(u) over X (u). For any value U = u of the message,
Alice’s encoder choses a codeword from X (u) randomly
from the distribution pX(u). Alice’s message distribution pU ,
codebook X , and all the codebook distributions pX(u) are all
known to both Bob and Calvin, but the values of the random
variables U and X(.) are unknown to them. If X (u) =
{x(u, r) : r ∈ Λu}, then the transmitted codeword X(U) has
the probability distribution given by Pr[X(U) = x(u, r)] =
pU (u)pX(u)(x(u, r)). Let p be the overall distribution of
codewords x = x(u, r) of Alice. It holds that p(x(u, r)) =
pU (u)pX(u)(x) and p(x) =
∑
U pU (u)pX(u)(x).
Calvin/Channel: Calvin possesses n jamming functions gi(.)
and n arbitrary jamming random variables Ji that satisfy the
following constraints.
Causality constraint: For each i ∈ [n], the jamming function
gi(.) maps xi = (x1, . . . , xi) and Ji = (J1, . . . ,Ji) to an
element of {0, 1}.
Power constraint: The number of indices i ∈ [n] for which
the value of gi(.) equals 1 is at most pn. That is, for all
xn,Jn,
∑
i gi(x
i,Ji) ≤ pn.
The output of the channel is the set of bits yi = xi⊕gi(xi,Ji)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Bob: Bob’s decoder is a (potentially) probabilistic function
h(.) of the received vector y. It maps the vectors y =
(y1, . . . yn) in {0, 1}n to the messages in U .
Code parameters: Bob is said to make a decoding error
if the message u′ he decodes differs from the message
u encoded by Alice. The probability of error for a given
message u is defined as the probability, over Alice, Calvin
and Bob’s random variables, that Bob makes a decoding
error. The probability of error of the code C is defined as
the average over all u ∈ U of the probability of error for
message u.
We define two types of rates and corresponding capacities.
The rate R is said to be weakly achievable if for every
ε > 0, δ > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists an
(n, (R − δ)n)-code that allows communication with proba-
bility of error at most ε. The supremum over n of the weakly
achievable rates is called the weak capacity and is denoted
by Cw.
The rate R is said to be strongly achievable1 if for every
δ > 0, ∃α > 0 so that for sufficiently large n there
exists an (n, (R−δ)n)-code that allows communication with
probability of error at most e−αn. The supremum over n of
the strongly achievable rates is called the strong capacity and
is denoted by Cs.
Remark: Since a rate that is strongly achievable is always
weakly achievable but the converse is not true in general,
Cw ≥ Cs.
1This definition is motivated by the extensive literature on error exponents
in information theory – for large classes of information-theoretic problems,
e.g. [9], [5], the probability of error of the coding scheme is required to
decay exponentially in block length.
III. RELATED WORK AND OUR RESULTS
To the best of our knowledge, communication in the
presence of a causal adversary has not been explicitly ad-
dressed in the literature (other than our prior work for causal
adversaries over large-q channels). Nevertheless, we note that
the model of causal channels, being a natural one, has been
“on the table” for several decades and the analysis of the
online/causal channel model appears as an open question in
the book of Csisza´r and Korner [5] (in the section addressing
Arbitrary Varying Channels [1]). Various variants of causal
adversaries have been addressed in the past, for instance [1],
[11], [15], [16], [13] – however the models considered therein
differ significantly from ours.
At a high level, we show that for causal adversaries, for a
large range of p (for all p > 0.25), the maximum achievable
rate equals that of the classical “omniscient” adversarial
model (i.e., 0). This may at first come as a surprise, as
the online adversary is weaker than the omniscient one,
and hence one may suspect that it allows a higher rate of
communication.
We have two main results. Theorem 1 gives an upper
bound on the weak capacity Cw if Alice’s encoder is de-
terministic. Theorem 2 gives an upper bound on the strong
capacity Cs in the more general case where Alice’s encoder
is probabilistic. Due to certain limitations of our proof
techniques, we do not present any bounds on the weak
capacity in the latter setting. The upper bound in both cases
equals min{1−H(p), (1− 4p)+}.
Theorem 1 (Deterministic encoder): For deterministic
codes, Cs ≤ Cw ≤ min{1−H(p), (1− 4p)+}.
Theorem 2 (Probabilistic encoder): For probabilistic
codes, Cs ≤ min{1−H(p), (1− 4p)+}.
We note that under a very weak notion of capacity in which
one only requires the success probability to be bounded
away from zero (instead of approaching 1), the capacity of
the omniscient channel, and thus the binary causal-adversary
channel, approaches 1−H(p). This follows by the fact that
for n sufficiently large and ℓ ≥ 4 there exists (n,Rn) codes
which are (ℓ, pn) list decodable with R = 1 − H(p)(1 +
1/ℓ) [7]. Communicating using an (ℓ, pn) list decodable
code allows Bob to decode a list of size ℓ of messages
which includes the message transmitted by Alice. Choosing
a message uniformly at random from his list, Bob decodes
correctly with probability at least 1/ℓ.
A. Outline of proof techniques
The upper bound of 1−H(p) follows directly by describing
an attack for Calvin wherein he approximately simulates
a BSC(p) (Binary Symmetric Channel [4] with crossover
probability p). More precisely, for each i ∈ [n] and any
sufficiently small ε > 0, Calvin flips xi with probability
p − ε until he runs out of his budget of pn bit-flips. By
the Chernoff bound [3], with very high probability he does
not run out of his budget, and is therefore indistinguishable
from a BSC(p − ε). But it is well-known [4] that in this
case the optimal rate of communication from Alice to Bob
is 1 −H(p − ε). Taking the limit when ε → 0 implies our
bound.
The upper bound of (1 − 4p)+ is more involved. For the
case where Alice’s encoder is deterministic, the proof of
Theorem 1 has the following overall structure. Assume for
sake of contradiction that Alice attempts to communicate at
rate greater than R = (1− 4p)+. To prove our upper bound
we design the following wait-and-push attack for Calvin.
Calvin starts by waiting for Alice to transmit approxi-
mately Rn bits. As Alice is assumed to communicate at rate
greater than R, the set of Alice’s codewords X ′ consistent
with the bits Calvin has seen so far is “large” with “high
probability”. Calvin constructs X ′ and chooses a codeword
x′ uniformly at random from X ′. He then actively “pushes”
x in the direction of x′ by flipping, with probability 1/2,
each future xi that differs from x′i. If Calvin succeeds in
pushing x to a word y roughly midway between x and
x′, a careful analysis demonstrates that regardless of Bob’s
decoding strategy, Bob is unable to determine whether Alice
transmitted x or x′ — causing a decoding error of 1/2
in this case. So, to prove our bound, we must show that
with constant probability (independent of the block length
n) Calvin will indeed succeed in pushing x to y. Namely,
that Alice’s codeword x and the codeword chosen at random
by Calvin x′ are of distance at most 2pn. Roughly speaking,
we prove the above by a detailed analysis of the distance
structure of the set of codewords in any code using tools
from extremal combinatorics and coding theory.
The case where Alice’s encoder may be randomized is
more technically challenging, and is considered in Theo-
rem 2. At a high level, the strategy of Calvin for a prob-
abilistic encoder follows that outlined for the deterministic
case. However, there are two main difficulties in its ex-
tended analysis. Firstly, the symmetry between x and x′
no longer exists. Namely, the fact that Bob may not be
able to distinguish which of the two were transmitted by
Alice does not necessarily cause a significant decoding error,
since the probability of x′ being transmitted by Alice may
well be significantly smaller than the probability that x
was transmitted. Secondly, the fact that both x and x′ may
correspond to the same message u places the entire scheme
in jeopardy. As it now no longer matters if Bob decodes to
x or x′, in both cases the decoded message will be that sent
by Alice.
To overcome these difficulties, we describe a more intricate
analysis of Calvin’s attack. Roughly speaking, we prove that
a “large” subset X ′′ of X ′ behaves “well”. Any x′ chosen
uniformly at random from X ′, with “significant” probability,
is in X ′′, and has three properties corresponding to those
when Alice uses a deterministic encoder. That is, x′ is
sufficiently close to x as desired, it has approximately the
same probability of transmission that x does (thus preserving
the needed symmetry), and it also corresponds to a message
that differs from that corresponding to x. All in all, we
show that the above three properties hold with probability
1/poly(n), which suffices to bound the strong capacity of
the channel at hand (but not the weak capacity).
In case of a randomized encoder of Alice, we assume that
the messages may have nonuniform distribution, and also any
message is encoded into one of a set of possible codewords as
per some probability distribution in that set. One may think
of various other ways of encoding, for example the following,
to confuse Calvin. But as we discuss in the next paragraph,
such schemes are also covered in our setup.
Multiple codebooks: In this scheme, Alice maintains a
set of codes C1, C2, . . . , CL. For transmitting a message u,
she randomly selects the code Ci with probability qi. If the
set of messages is U = {1, 2, . . . ,M} with a probability
distribution given by pi
△
= Pr{u = i}, and the code Cr
contains the codewords {x(u, r) | u = 1, 2, . . . ,M}, then
in our setup, the corresponding codebook for the message u
will be X (u) = {x(u, r) | r = 1, 2, . . . , L}. This codebook
may have less than L codewords due to common codewords
in the original codes. The induced probability distribution in
this codebook of u is given by Pr{x|u} =
∑
r:x(u,r)=x qr.
If Alice picks a code and uses it to encode several
messages, even then she does not gain anything. First, if
she uses the same code to encode too many messages (and
calvin knows the encoding scheme, as assumed), then both
Bob and Calvin will know the code used after receiving or
‘reading’ some codewords. On the other hand, if a randomly
chosen code is used only to encode a block of few messages
this is equivalent to using a longer (‘superblock’) code in
our setup. The only difference is that the probability of error
analysed in our set up is the probability of error in decoding
the ‘superblocks’ rather than the smaller blocks/codewords.
The proofs of the upper bounds corresponding to 1−H(p)
have already been sketched in Section III-A. Hence we only
provide proofs of the upper bounds corresponding to (1 −
4p)+ in Theorems 1 and 2.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let R = (1− 4p)++ ε for some ε > 0. Let log(.) denote
the binary logarithm, here and throughout. By assumption for
deterministic codes, Alice’s message space U is of size 2Rn.
Here we assume for that 2Rn in an integer. This implies that
the set X of Alice’s transmitted codewords is of size 2Rn. 2
We now present Calvin’s attack. We show that for any
fixed ε > 0, regardless of Bob’s decoding strategy, there
is a decoding error with constant probability (namely, the
error probability is independent of n). Calvin’s attack is in
two stages. First Calvin passively waits until Alice transmits
ℓ = (R − ε/2)n bits over the channel. Let xℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be
the value of the codeword observed so far. He then considers
the set of codewords that are consistent with the observed xℓ.
Namely, Calvin constructs the set X |xℓ = {x = x1, . . . , xn ∈
2In fact, X may be smaller, however we note that for codes of optimal
rate, |X | is of size exactly 2Rn. If |X | < 2Rn, then for some transmitted
codeword x at least two messages u and u′ must both be encoded to x.
On receiving x, Bob’s probability of error is maximal – it is at least 1/2.
Therefore changing the codebook so as to encode u′ as some x′ /∈ X cannot
increase the probability of decoding error.
X | x1, . . . , xℓ = x
ℓ}. He then chooses an element x′ ∈ X|xℓ
uniformly at random. In the second stage, Calvin follows a
random bit-flip strategy. That is, for each remaining bit x′i of
x′ that differs from the corresponding bit xi of x transmitted,
he flips the transmitted bit with probability 1/2, until he has
either flipped pn bits, or until i = n.
We analyze Calvin’s attack by a series of claims. We first
show that with high probability (w.h.p.) the set X |xℓ is large.
Claim 4.1: With probability at least 1 − 2−εn/4, the set
X|xℓ is of size at least 2εn/4.
Proof: The number of messages u for which X|xℓ(u)
is of size less than 2εn/4 is at most the number of distinct
prefixes xℓ times 2εn/4, which in turn is at most 2ℓ+εn/4 =
2(R−ε/4)n.
Now assume that the message u is such that its correspond-
ing set X |xℓ(u) is of size at least 2εn/4. We now show that this
implies that the transmitted codeword x and the codeword x′
chosen by Calvin are distinct and of small Hamming distance
apart with a positive probability (independent of n).
Claim 4.2: Conditioned on Claim 4.1, with probability at
least ε64p , x 6= x
′ and dH(x,x′) < 2pn− εn/8.
Proof: Consider the undirected graph G = (V , E) in
which the vertex set V consists of the set X|xℓ and two
nodes are connected by an edge if their Hamming distance
is less than d = 2pn − εn/8. An independent set I in G
corresponds to a subset of codewords in {0, 1}n that are all
(pairwise) at distance greater than d.
Since the codewords in X|xℓ all have the same prefix xℓ,
one may consider only the suffix (of length n− ℓ = 4pn−
εn/2) of the codewords in X|xℓ . Here we assume p ≤ 0.25,
minor modifications in the proof are needed for larger p. The
set of vectors defined by the suffixes in an independent set
I of G now corresponds to a binary error-correcting code
of length 4pn − εn/2, with |I| codewords and minimum
distance d.
By Plotkin’s bound [2] there do not exist binary error cor-
recting codes with more than 2d2d−(4pn−εn/2) +1 codewords.
Thus I, any maximal independent set in G, must satisfy
|I| ≤
2(2pn− εn/8)
2(2pn− εn/8)− 4pn+ εn/2
+ 1 =
16p
ε
(1)
By Tura´n’s theorem [17], any undirected graph G of size
|V| and average degree ∆ has an independent set of size
at least |V|/(∆ + 1). This, along with (1) implies that the
average degree of our graph G satisfies
|V|
∆+ 1
≤ |I| ≤
16p
ε
This in turn implies that
∆ ≥
ε|V|
16p
− 1 ≥
ε|V|
32p
The second inequality is for large enough n, since |V| is of
size at least 2Rn. To summarize the above discussion, we
have shown that our graph G has large average degree of
size ∆ ≥ ε|V |32p . We now use this fact to analyze Calvin’s
attack.
By the definition of deterministic codes, any codeword in
X is transmitted with equal probability. Also, by definition
both x (the transmitted codeword) and x′ (the codeword
chosen by Calvin) are in V = X |xℓ . Hence both x and x′ are
uniform in X |xℓ . This implies that with probability |E|/|V|2
the nodes corresponding to codewords x and x′ are distinct
and connected by an edge in G. This in turn implies that with
probability |E|/|V|2, x 6= x′ and dH(x,x′) < 2pn − εn/8,
as required. Now
|E|
|V|2
=
∆|V|
2|V|2
≥
ε
64p
Conditioned on Claim 4.2, Calvin’s codeword x′ is
very close to Alice’s transmitted codeword x. Specifically,
dH(x,x
′) ∈ (0, 2pn − εn/8). We now show that if Calvin
follows the random bit-flip strategy, from Bob’s perspective
(w.h.p.), both x or x′ were equally likely to have been
transmitted by Alice.
We first show that during Calvin’s random bit-flip process,
w.h.p., Calvin does not “run out” of his budget of pn bit flips.
Claim 4.3: Conditioned on Claim 4.2, with probability at
least 1− 2−Ω(ε2n)
dH(x,y) ∈
(
d
2
−
εn
16
,
d
2
+
εn
16
)
. (2)
Proof: The expected number of locations flipped by
Calvin is d/2 ≤ pn−εn/16. Assume that d/2 = pn−εn/16
(for smaller values of d the bound is only tighter). By Sanov’s
theorem [4, Theorem 12.4.1], the probability that the number
of bits flipped by Calvin deviates from the expectation d/2
by more than εn/16 is at most e−Ω(ε2n2/d) ≤ e−Ω(ε2n) for
large enough n.
It should be noted that d/2 + εn/16 ≤ pn, and so
dH(x,y) ≤ d/2 + εn/16 implies that the number of bits
flipped by Calvin does not exceed pn. Since Calvin possibly
flips only the bits of x which differ from the corresponding
bits in x′, (2) also implies
dH(x
′,y) ∈
(
d
2
−
εn
16
,
d
2
+
εn
16
)
. (3)
We conclude by proving that if the number of bits flipped
by Calvin lies in the range (d/2−εn/16, d/2+εn/16), then
indeed Bob cannot distinguish between the case in which x
or x′ were transmitted.
Claim 4.4: Conditioned on Claim 4.3 Bob makes a de-
coding error with probability at least 1/2.
Proof: By Bayes’ Theorem [8], if Bob receives y,
the a posteri probability that Alice transmitted x, denoted
p(x|y), equals p(y|x)p(x)/p(y). Here p(x) is the probability
(over her encoding strategy) that Alice transmits x, p(y|x)
is the probability (over Calvin’s random bit-flipping strategy)
that Bob receives y given that Alice transmits x, and p(y)
is the resulting probability that Bob receives y. Similarly,
p(x′|y) = p(y|x′)p(x′)/p(y). Taking the ratio and noting
that for deterministic codes p(x) = p(x′), we have
p(x|y)/p(x′|y) = p(y|x)/p(y|x′). (4)
Since Calvin’s random bit-flip strategy involves him flip-
ping bits of x (which are different from the corresponding
bits of x′) with probability 1/2, for all y satisfying (2), the
probabilities p(y|x) and p(y|x′) are equal. This observation
and (4) together imply p(x|y) = p(x′|y). Thus, Bob cannot
distinguish whether x or x′ were transmitted. Namely, on the
pair of events in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses
x′ and in which Alice transmits x′ and Calvin chooses x, no
matter which decoding process Bob uses, he will have an
average decoding error of at least 1/2. This suffices to prove
our assertion.
Thus a decoding error happens if the con-
ditions of Claims 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are
all satisfied. This happens with probability at
least
(
1− 2−εn/4
) (
ε
64p
)(
1− 2−Ω(ε
2n)
) (
1
2
)
≥(
1
2
) (
ε
64p
) (
1
2
) (
1
2
)
≥ ε512p for large enough n.

V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We start by proving the following technical Lemma that we
use in our proof. Let q be an arbitrary probability distribution
over an index set I = {1, . . . , k}. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be
arbitrary discrete random variables with probability distribu-
tions q1, . . . , qk over alphabets A1, . . . ,Ak respectively. Let
ki = |Ai|. Let A be a random variable that equals the random
variable Ai with probability q(i). Then the following Lemma
describing an elementary property of the entropy function
H(.) is useful in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5.1: The entropies of A,A1, . . . ,Ak and q satisfy
H(A) ≤
∑k
i=1 q(i)H(Ai)+H(q), with equality if and only
if for each i, i′ for which both q(i) and q(i′) are positive it
holds that Prqi,qi′ [Ai = Ai′ ] = 0.
Proof: For any a ∈ A, the probability Pr{A = a} =
p(a) of occurrence of a, equals
∑
i:a∈Ai q(i)qi(a). Hence
H(A) = −
∑
a∈
S
i
Ai
p(a) log(p(a))
≤ −
k∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
q(i)qi(j) log(q(i)qi(j)) (5)
=
k∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
q(i) (qi(j) log(qi(j)))
+
k∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
qi(j) (q(i) log(q(i)))
=
k∑
i=1
q(i)H(Ai) +H(q).
Here (5) follows from Jensen’s inequality, e.g. [4], with
equality if and only if for each positive Pr{A = a}, there is
a unique i such that q(i)qi(j) > 0 (here ai(j) = a).
We now turn to prove Theorem 2. Recall our notation: let
U be the random variable corresponding to Alice’s message
and pU its distribution (with entropy Rn). Throughout we
assume the message set U (the support of U) is at most
of size 2n. Let X be Alice’s codebook. X is a collection
{X (u)} of subsets of {0, 1}n. For each subset X (u) ⊂ X ,
there is a corresponding codeword random variable X(u)
with codeword distribution pX(u) over X (u). For any value
U = u of the message, Alice’s encoder choses a codeword
from X (u) randomly from the distribution pX(u). Alice’s
message distribution pU , codebook X , and all the codebook
distributions pX(u) are all known to both Bob and Calvin,
but the values of the random variables U and X(.) are
unknown to them. If X (u) = {x(u, r) : r ∈ Λu}, then the
transmitted codeword X(U) has the probability distribution
given by Pr[X(U) = x(u, r)] = pU (u)pX(u)(x(u, r)). Let
p the the overall distribution of codewords x = x(u, r)
of Alice. It holds that p(x(u, r)) = pU (u)pX(u)(x) and
p(x) =
∑
U pU (u)pX(u)(x).
For any ε > 0, let R = (1 − 4p)+ + ε. We start
by specifying Calvin’s attack. Calvin uses a very similar
attack to the one described in the proof of Theorem 1.
That is, Calvin first passively waits until Alice transmits
ℓ = (R − ε/2)n bits over the channel. Let xℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
be the value of the codeword observed so far. He then
considers the set of codewords x(u, r) consistent with the
observed xℓ. Here and throughout this section, we denote
codewords by their corresponding message u and index r
in X (u). As it may be that x(u, r) is exactly the same
codeword as x(u′, r′), the sets in the definitions to follow
and in this section are in a sense multisets. Namely, Calvin
constructs the set X|xℓ = {x(u, r) = x1, . . . , xn ∈ X |
x1, . . . , xℓ = x
ℓ}. Let p(xℓ) = p(X|xℓ) be the probability,
under the probability distribution p, corresponding to the
event that Calvin observes xℓ in the first ℓ transmissions. Let
pU|
x
ℓ
and pX(u)|
x
ℓ
be the probability distributions pU and
pX(u) also respectively conditioned on the same event. Calvin
then chooses an element x′(u′, r′) ∈ X |xℓ with probability3
pU|
x
ℓ
(u′)pX(u′)|
x
ℓ
(x′(u′, r′)). In the second stage he then
follows exactly the same random bit-flip strategy as in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Recall that in the proof of Theorem 1, our goal was
to prove that with some constant probability, the distance
between x(u, r) and x′(u′, r′) is approximately 2pn. Loosely
speaking, this allows the success of Calvin’s attack (i.e.,
imply a decoding error). Following the same outline of
proof, we now show that with probability 1/poly(n) the
codeword x′(u′, r′) chosen by Calvin has the following three
properties:
• It’s corresponding message differs from that correspond-
ing to x(u, r) (i.e., u 6= u′).
• x′(u′, r′) is close to x(u, r) and thus Calvin will be able
3This is one significant difference from the attack in the proof of
Theorem 1 – there Calvin chooses each x′ uniformly at random from the
corresponding consistent set.
to “push” x(u, r) to a codeword y at approximately the
same distance from x(u, r) and x′(u′, r′).
• Given y, Bob is unable to distinguish whether x(u, r)
or x′(u′, r′) was transmitted.
To this end, we partition the set X|xℓ into n2 disjoint subsets
X ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let p(X ij) be the probability
mass of X ij . Let pU|ij and pX(u)|ij be the probability
distributions pU and pX(u) respectively conditioned on the
event that Alice transmitted x(u, r) in X ij . The partition
X ij is obtained in two steps – first we partition X|xℓ into n
subsets X i, then we partition each X i into n sets X ij . We
also use the probability distribution p(X i), pU|i and pX(u)|i
defined accordingly. All in all, we prove the existence of a
subset X ij with the following properties
• H(pU|ij ) is “large”.
• p(X ij) is large with respect to p(xℓ).
• For any x(u, r) ∈ X ij it holds that p(x(u, r)) has
approximately the same value.
• pU|ij is approximately uniform on its support.
Roughly speaking, proving these properties on X ij reduces
us to the case of a deterministic encoder (addressed in
Theorem 1) and allows us to complete our proof.
We now present our proof for the existence of X ij as
specified above. We first show that with positive probability
the set X|xℓ has high entropy.
Claim 5.1: With probability at least ε/4, H(pU|
x
ℓ
) ≥
εn/4.
Proof: Let q be the probability distribution over {0, 1}ℓ
for which q(xℓ) = p(xℓ) for all possible xℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ.
Let qxℓ be the probability distribution pU|
x
ℓ
. Now using
Lemma 5.1 we obtain
H(pU ) ≤
∑
xℓ
q(xℓ)H(pU|
x
ℓ
) +H(q). (6)
By our definitions H(pU ) = Rn. Moreover, H(q) ≤ ℓ =
(R− ε/2)n (since q is defined over an alphabet of size 2ℓ).
Thus (6) becomes∑
xℓ
q(xℓ)H(pU|
x
ℓ
) ≥ Rn− (R− ε/2)n = εn/2.
As the average of H(pU|
x
ℓ
) is at least εn/2, then H(pU|
x
ℓ
) ≥
εn/4 with probability at least ε/4 (by a Markov type inequal-
ity, here we use the fact that H(pU|
x
ℓ
) ≤ n).
We now define the sets X i. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, let X i
be the set of codewords in X|xℓ for which p(x(u, r))/p(xℓ)
is in the range (2−3i, 2−3i+3]. The set X n is defined to be
the set of codewords in X |xℓ for which p(x(u, r))/p(xℓ)
is in the range [0, 2−3n+3]. Let p(X i) be the probability
mass of X i. Namely p(X i) ≃ 2−3i|X i|p(xℓ). Let q be the
distribution over {1, 2, . . . , n} taking i w.p. p(X i)/p(xℓ).
Notice that H(q) ≤ log(n) = o(n) (as its support is of size
n). Conditioning on Claim 5.1 and using Lemma 5.1 it can
be verified that
Claim 5.2:∑
i
q(i)H(pU|i) ≥ H(pU|
x
ℓ
)−H(q) ≥ εn/8 (7)
Consider sets X i with (relative) mass q(i) ≥ 1/n2. It holds
that ∑
i≤n−1;q(i)≥1/n2
q(i)H(pU|i) ≥ εn/16
The above follows from the fact that∑
i≤n−1;q(i)≤1/n2 q(i)H(pU|i) + q(n)H(pU|i) ≤∑
i≤n−1;q(i)≤1/n2 n/n
2+2−n+3n ≤ 2 (for sufficiently large
n). Here we use the fact that q(n) ≤ |X i|2−3n+3.
We conclude the existence of a set X i such that q(i) ≥
1/n2 and H(pU|i) ≥ εn/16. We now further partition X i.
For j = 1, . . . , n−1, let X ij be the set of codewords x(u, r)
in X i for which pU|i(u) is in the range (2−3j, 2−3j+3]. X in
is defined to be the set of codewords x(u, r) in X i for
which pU|i(u) is in the range [0, 2−3n+3]. Let p(X ij) be the
probability mass of X ij . Namely p(X ij) ≃ 2−3i|X ij |p(xℓ).
Let q′ be the distribution over {1, 2, . . . , n} taking j w.p.
p(X ij)/p(X i). Notice that H(q′) ≤ log(n) = o(n) (as its
support is of size n). As before, conditioning on Claim 5.2
and using Lemma 5.1 it can be verified that (for the index i
specified above),
Claim 5.3:∑
j
q′(j)H(pU|ij ) ≥ H(pU|i)−H(q
′) ≥ εn/32 (8)
Again, consider sets X ij with mass q′(i) ≥ 1/n2. It holds
that ∑
j≤n−1;q′(j)≥1/n2
q′(j)H(pU|ij ) ≥ εn/64
We conclude the existence of a set X ij such that
• H(pU|ij ) ≥ εn/64.
• p(X ij) ≥ p(x
ℓ)/n4.
• For any x(u, r) ∈ X ij it holds that p(x(u, r)) is
approximately 2−3ip(xℓ).
• For any x(u, r) ∈ X ij it holds that pU|ij (u) is approx-
imately equal.
The set X ij is exactly what we are looking for. Roughly
speaking, by Claim 5.1, with probability at least ε/4 Calvin
views a prefix xℓ for which H(pU|
x
ℓ
) ≥ εn/4. Conditioning
on this event, both Alice and Calvin choose codewords
x(u, r), x′(u′, r′) in X ij with probability at least 1/n8.
We now sketch to remainder of the proof which closely
follows that of Theorem 1. We partition X ij into groups
of messages X ij(u) consisting of all codewords in X ij
corresponding to u. Recall that each codeword x(u, r) ∈ X ij
has approximately the same probability p(x(u, r)), and for
each x(u, r) ∈ X ij it holds that pU|ij (u) is approximately
the same value. This implies that each group X ij(u) ⊆ X ij
has approximately the same size. Moreover, as H(pU|ij ) ≥
εn/64 it holds that there are at least 2εn/64 non-empty
subsets X ij(u) in X ij .
So, all in all, X ij has a very symmetric structure: it
includes many groups, each consisting of elements with the
same transmission probability, and each of approximately
the same size and mass (w.r.t. p). This reduces us to the
case considered in Theorem 1 in which our subset X|xℓ
included many messages, each with the same probability,
details follow.
Consider the graph G = (V , E) in which the vertex set V
consists of the set X ij and two nodes are connected by an
edge if their Hamming distance is less than d = 2pn−εn/8.
Now, it is can be verified (using analysis almost identical
to that given in the proof of Theorem 1) that
1) With probability at least 1 − 2−Ω(εn) the codewords
x(u, r) and x′(u′, r′) satisfy u 6= u′. Here one needs
to take into consideration the slight difference in the
group sizes and the probabilities for each codeword.
2) With probability Ω
(
ε
p
)
the vertices in G corresponding
to x(u, r) and x′(u′, r′) are connected by an edge.
3) During Calvin’s random bit-flip process, with high
probability of 1− 2−Ω(ε2n), Calvin does not “run out”
of his budget of pn bit flips.
4) Conditioning on the above, Bob cannot distinguish
between the case in which x(u, r) or x′(u′, r′) were
transmitted.
5) Finally, on the pair of events in which Alice trans-
mits x(u, r) and Calvin chooses x′(u′, r′), and Alice
transmits x′(u′, r′) and Calvin chooses x(u, r), no
matter which decoding process Bob uses, he has an
average decoding error that is bounded away from zero.
Here again we take into account the slight differences
between p(x(u, r)) and p(x′(u′, r′)).
To summarize, Calvin causes a decoding error with prob-
ability Ω(poly(ε)/poly(n)) = Ω(1/poly(n)) as desired. This
concludes our proof. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We analyze the capacity of the causal-adversarial channel
and show (for both deterministic and probabilistic encoders)
that the capacity is bounded by above by min{1−H(p), (1−
4p)+}. For a large range of p (for all p > 0.25), the
maximum achievable rate equals that of the stronger classical
“omniscient” adversarial model (i.e., 0).
Several questions remain open. In this work we do not
address achievability results (i.e., the construction of codes).
It would be very interesting to obtain codes for the causal-
adversary channel which obtain rate greater than that know
for the “omniscient” adversarial model (i.e., the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound) for p < 0.25). As we do not believe
that the upper bound of (1 − 4p)+ presented in this work
is actually tight, such codes, if they exist, may give a hint to
the correct capacity.
As done in our work on large alphabets [6], one may
also consider the more general channel model in which for
a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), the jammer’s decision on
the corruption of xi must depend solely on xj for j ≤
i − dn. This might correspond to the scenario in which the
error transmission of the adversarial jammer is delayed due
to certain computational tasks that the adversary needs to
perform. The capacity of the causal channel with delay is an
intriguing problem left open in this work.
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